Method and processing unit for secure processing of access controlled audio/video data

This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No 12/971,876 entitled “METHOD AND PROCESSING UNIT FOR SECURE PROCESSING OF ACCESS CONTROLLED AUDIO/VIDEO DATA” filed Dec. 17, 2010 and is a continuation-in-part of PCT international application PCT/EP2010/069829 filed on Dec. 15, 2010, which claims priority Rail to European application EP09179559.1 filed Dec. 17, 2009.

The present invention relates to units for secure processing of access controlled digital audio/video data. These units are included in different multimedia facilities as for example personal computers, mobile equipment or digital pay television decoders. A method for processing said audio/video data before output towards a peripheral device of a user is also described.

A digital audio/video data processing unit like a digital television decoder or “set top box” includes a main module gathering essential functions for the decryption of the received data, generally called deciphering or descrambling unit or calculation module. The audio/video data entering the calculation module is encrypted with control words CW transmitted in a control message ECM (Entitlement Control message) stream associated with the audio/video data stream. The calculation module includes a particular circuit in charge of extracting the control words CW from the control messages ECM and decrypting them using keys made available by the processing unit and/or by a security module associated to said unit.

A security module can be implemented in a variety of manners such as on a microprocessor card, on a smartcard or any electronic module in the form of a badge or key. These modules are generally portable and detachable from the host user unit and are designed to be tamper-proof. The most commonly used form has electrical contacts, but contactless versions of type ISO 14443 also exist. Another implementation of the security module consists either of a directly soldered integrated circuit inside the user unit or a circuit on a socket or connector such as a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) module. The security module may also be integrated on a chip which has another function e.g. on a descrambling module or on a microprocessor module of a pay television set top box. The security module can also be implemented as a software device managed by a processor of the user unit.

A control message ECM contains, in addition to the control word, access conditions required for the control word to be sent back to the processing unit. At the time of the decryption of a control message usually encrypted by a transmission key, the security module verifies if the conditions to access audio/video data sent in a stream are satisfied, i.e. the access rights stored in the security module are present. These rights are generally sent by the head end in entitlement management messages EMM which update the rights stored in the security module.

The control word is only returned to the processing unit when the rights verification is successful. According to a known Pay-TV broadcasting mode, three elements are necessary to decrypt a program at a given time, namely:

a) Data related to the program encrypted by one or a plurality of control words, b) Control message(s) ECM containing the control words and access conditions, c) Corresponding user rights stored in the security module allowing verifying the access conditions.

Accounting for the use of audio video content or other conditional access data is based on subscription, purchases of selected programs or on payment by time units.

In order to improve security of the control words which are the most sensitive elements of a Pay-TV system, several solutions have been developed such as for example:

The document EP1485857B1 describes a method for matching a decoder with a removable security module. The system formed by the decoder and the security module receives digital audio/video data encrypted by a control word and control messages ECM containing the encrypted control word. A first key is assigned to the decoder and a second key to the security module. These two keys form a unique pair in the broadcast network of the audio/video data. Only one key of the key pair can be chosen arbitrarily while the other is determined according to the first key in a way that the combination of these two keys conforms to a pairing key of the system, thus allowing to decrypt the control word.

The document EP1421789B1 discloses a process of controlling access to encrypted data transmitted by an operator to a plurality of subscribers groups. Each group has a group key and each subscriber receives from the operator an operating key encrypted by the group key to decipher the transmitted data. The process consists of associating the operating key encrypted with the group key to a random value for generating a secret code. This code is transmitted via a management message EMM to the subscribers to calculate the operating key at the reception of the random value transmitted by control messages ECM. The process uses only one access control and it allows for dissuading the publication of the operating keys by making them dependent on the subscriber group.

The document EP1078524B1 describes a coupling or matching method in order to make a security module dependent on the host apparatus, in this case a Pay-TV decoder, and vice versa. The aim of this matching mechanism is to protect the communications between the security module and the decoder in order to prevent the capture, from the transmission channel, of the control words allowing for the deciphering of the transmitted program data. The matching allows also for the prevention of the use of the security module with a foreign host apparatus or conversely. The solution uses a unique key or a unique key pair to encrypt and decrypt the data exchanged between the security module and the decoder. This unique key is maintained secret and unchanged during the whole life of the related devices. One or other of the connected devices can verify, at any moment, the validity of the matching parameters and take appropriate counter-measures when a match is not found.

The document WO2006/040482 describes a method of recomposing a control word on the one hand by a security module and on the other hand by a decoder. Neither of the two devices alone can obtain the complete control word. The message including the two parts of the control word moreover contains two access conditions, one for the security module and the other for the decoder.

The document WO2009/144264A1 describes a method for secure processing digital access controlled audio/video data and a processing unit configured for the same and able to receive control messages. The control messages comprise at least one first control word and first right execution parameters, at least one second control word and second right execution parameters. The processing unit being connected to a first access control device comprises:

means for verifying and applying the first right execution parameters in relation to the contents of a memory associated to the first access control device and means for obtaining the first control word, a second access control device integrated into the processing unit including means for verifying and applying the second right execution parameters in relation to the contents of a memory associated to the second access control device and means for obtaining the second control word, a deciphering module configured for deciphering, sequentially with the first and the second control word, the access controlled audio/video data, the first and second control words being provided respectively by the first and second access control devices and stored in said deciphering module.

The document EP1523188A1 discloses a method for pairing a first element and a second element, wherein the first element and the second element form a first decoding system among a plurality of receiving decoding systems in a broadcasting network. Each receiving decoding system is adapted to descramble scrambled audiovisual information received over the broadcasting network. A first key unique in the broadcasting network is selected. A second key is determined according to the first key, such that a combination of the first key and the second key enables to decrypt broadcasted encrypted control data that is received to be decrypted by each receiving decoding system, the encrypted control data being identical for each receiving decoding system. The first key and the second key are assigned respectively to the first element and the second element.

The document U.S. Pat. No. 5,029,207A discloses a decoder for descrambling encoded satellite transmissions comprising an internal security element and a replaceable security module. The program signal is scrambled with a key and then the key itself is twice-encrypted and multiplexed with the scrambled program signal. The key is first encrypted with a first secret serial number which is assigned to a given replaceable security module. The key is then encrypted with a second secret serial number which is assigned to a given decoder. The decoder performs a first key decryption using the second secret serial number stored within the decoder. The partially decrypted key is then further decrypted by the replaceable security module using the first secret serial number stored in the replaceable security module. The decoder then descrambles the program using the twice-decrypted key.

To sum up, the security of the control words may be improved by the following measures:

a transmission through a secured channel between the security module and the processing unit, a plurality of conditional access modules requiring each a verification of the access conditions or rights, reception of a control word in several parts sent either in one or several control messages. Appropriate instructions allow rebuilding the control word from its parts by a processing module before making it available to the descrambler.

The present invention aims to reinforce the security of the control words while increasing the efficiency and the speed of the verification operations. A combination of the first two above mentioned measures contributes to achieve this aim according to the method described by claim 1 .

The method consists mainly of access conditions verification performed by two conditional access devices consecutively on a control message before releasing a control word and forwarding it to a descrambler. The control message is structured so that it encapsulates another control message.

A further object of the invention is a processing unit for secure processing of access controlled audio/video data comprising features as described by claim 14 .

A conventional control message comprises access conditions and a control word. According to the method of the present invention; the control message is structured as the conventional control message with a first part including access conditions and, in place of the control word, a second part structured as a control message including second access condition and a control word. Thus, the control message encapsulates another control message.

In document WO2009/144264A1, the final control word is obtained by a cryptographic combination of a first part obtained by a first access control device such as a removable security module and a second part obtained by a second access control device such as a chip integrated in the processing unit. The control messages transport rights execution parameters data necessary to the access control devices for producing the appropriate control word used for deciphering scrambled audio/video data. The two access control devices thus function together, i.e. in parallel.

In the present invention, the control message needs to be verified and processed by the first conditional access device before transmitting the second part structured as another control message to the second conditional access device. After verification, this second conditional access device extracts the control word from the second part. in this case the two conditional access devices operate sequentially one after the other i.e. in series.

The invention will be better understood thanks to the following detailed description which refers to the enclosed drawings given as non limitative examples.

FIG. 1 shows the structure of a control message involved in a preferred embodiment of the method of the invention.

FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of a processing unit provided with two conditional access devices respectively in the form of a software device and a system on chip.

FIG. 3 shows the structure of a control message involved in an optional embodiment of the method of the invention.

The control message ECM 1 =(AC 1 , ECM 2 ) is made up of a first pad including first access conditions AC 1 and of a second part ECM 2 structured as a control message ECM 2 =(AC 2 , CW) including at least second access conditions AC 2 and a control word CW, see FIG. 1 . In other words, the control message ECM 1 includes a secret represented by the second part ECM 2 which includes the control word CW as a secret. The control message ECM 1 encapsulates thus another control message ECM 2 .

Further data FD such as headers, data stream identifiers, parameters related to the broadcast data or to the broadcaster, etc., generally complete the control message ECM 1 .

The first access conditions AC 1 which appear in general in form of rights necessary to the user for accessing one or more broadcast audio/video data streams. These rights consist of codes, which indicate a subscription, an authorization for accessing an event or broadcast program content or a validity period of the access, etc. Preferably, the control message ECM 1 is encrypted with a common key K 1 present in all processing units PU having a first conditional access device CAD 1 in the form of a security module as defined above in a wide way in the technical background section.

In a preferred embodiment, the first conditional access device CAD 1 consists of a software device OAK (Conditional Access Kernel) configured to verify the first access conditions AC 1 by using an access rights database RDB stored in a memory of the processing unit PU.

The second part ECM 2 of the control message ECM 1 includes second access conditions AC 2 which preferably complete the first access conditions AC 1 with further parameters related for example to characteristics of a processing unit PU associated to the first conditional access device CAD 1 . This second part ECM 2 may also be encrypted with a common key K 2 present in all processing units PU having a second conditional access device CAD 2 implemented inside the processing unit PU in the form of a hardware component of a system on chip SOC according to a preferred configuration.

The second part ECM 2 further includes the control word CW which can be retrieved only if the first and the second access conditions AC 1 and AC 2 are in accordance with the access rights R 1 and R 2 stored in the access rights database RDB and verified successfully with the conditional access devices CAD 1 and CAD 2 . The access right R 1 is associated to the access right R 2 so that when the access right R 1 is verified successfully by the first conditional access devices CAD 1 the access R 2 is loaded into the second conditional access device CAD 2 .

According to a preferred configuration, the first conditional access device CAD 1 in form of the software device OAK is provided with more advanced features needing a more detailed verification of the access conditions AC 1 than the second conditional access device CAD 2 which is mainly a hardware device.

The control message ECM 1 and the second part ECM 2 are preferably accompanied by authentication data A 1 and A 2 , i.e. authentication data A 1 is associated to the control message ECM 1 (or at least the access conditions AC 1 ) and authentication data A 2 is associated to the second part ECM 2 . These authentication data A 1 and A 2 are provided by the broadcaster or the head end equipped with appropriate units for preparing the different streams of access controlled audio/video data DATe. The authentication data A 1 and A 2 are used for verifying the authenticity and integrity of the messages after decryption with the keys K 1 and K 2 specific to respectively the first and second conditional access device CAD 1 and CAD 2 .

The authentication data A 1 and A 2 may be in the form of a message authentication code (MAC) which is compared with a code calculated by the conditional access device (CAD 1 , CAD 2 ) and when the code of the concerned control message ECM 1 , or part ECM 2 is identical to the calculated code, the control message ECM 1 , and the part ECM 2 are considered as authentic. HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code), may also be used by involving a cryptographic hash function in combination with a secret key known by the respective conditional access devices (CAD 1 , CAD 2 ). Any iterative cryptographic hash function, such as MD5 or SHA-1, may be used in the calculation of an HMAC; the resulting MAC algorithm is called HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1 accordingly. Other techniques of authentication may also be used such as RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) algorithms with symmetric or asymmetric keys.

According to an embodiment, either the first authentication data Al associated to the control message ECM 1 or the second authentication data A 2 associated to the second part ECM 2 of the control message or both of the authentication data (A 1 , A 2 ) are encrypted by the respective key (K 1 , K 2 ) of the first conditional access device CAD 1 and the second conditional access device CAD 2 .

In this case, cryptograms (A 1 )K 1 and (A 2 )K 2 thus obtained are called signatures of the authentication data A 1 and A 2 .

The processing unit PU as represented schematically by FIG. 2 comprises a main processor MCPU managing the first conditional access device CAD 1 associated to a rights database RDB and a receiving module REC into which enters a stream of encrypted audio/video content data DATe and a stream of control data comprising control messages ECM 1 . These streams are sent by the head end of the broadcaster together with management messages EMM for updating regularly the access rights (R 1 , R 2 ) stored in the access rights database RDB.

The entitlement management messages EMM are personalized for each processing unit managed by the head end which maintains a database comprising addresses and identifiers of the units, the keys K 1 K 2 specific to all first and second conditional access devices CAD 1 , CAD 2 of the processing units PU, personal keys K CAD1 , K CAD2 embedded in each individual first and second conditional access devices CAD 1 , CAD 2 .

An EMM message contains thus at least the address of the processing unit, access rights R 1 , R 2 encrypted by their corresponding conditional access devices personal keys K CAD1 , K CAD2 and their signatures S(R 1 ), S(R 2 ) made up of their messages authentication code encrypted by their respective personal keys K CAD1 , K CAD2 . The rights R 1 , R 2 can be decrypted and verified successfully before storing into the rights database RDB only by the particular processing unit to which the EMM message is addressed.

After sorting the input data, the receiving module REC forwards the control messages ECM 1 to the first conditional access device CAD 1 while the encrypted audio/video data DATe is buffered in the processing unit PU by waiting for their descrambling with the control word CW to be retrieved. The conditional access device CAD 1 receives the control message ECM 1 for decrypting with the key K 1 stored in an appropriate memory and for verifying the authenticity thanks to the authentication data A 1 . The second part ECM 2 of the control message is temporally stored in the first conditional access device CAD 1 until complete verification of the first access conditions AC 1 has been performed.

When the control message ECM 1 has passed the authenticity and integrity tests, the first access conditions AC 1 are compared with the first access right R 1 stored in the right database RDB. According to a particular embodiment, the first access right comprises a signature S(R 1 ) using a first personal key K CAD1 embedded in a particular first conditional access device CAD 1 . In this case, the right R 1 is firstly verified thanks to the signature S(R 1 ) and the first personal key K CAD1 . Once this verification is successfully executed, the access conditions AC 1 is compared with the right R 1 If this verification of concordance is successful, the previously stored second part ECM 2 of the control message is transmitted to the second conditional access device CAD 2 together with the second access right R 2 retrieved from the rights database RDB. The second part ECM 2 is decrypted with the device key K 2 which is generally distinct from the one of the first conditional access device CAD 1 . Authenticity and integrity is also checked thanks to the authentication data A 2 in a similar way than for the control message ECM 1 in the first conditional access device CAD 1 .

The second right R 2 is preferably personalized for the second access control device CAD 2 i.e. encrypted or signed with the second personal key K CAD2 which is a key embedded in one particular second conditional access device CAD 2 . According to a preferred embodiment, the second right R 2 is signed with a signature S(R 2 ) generated with the second personal key K CAD2 . This signature S(R 2 ) is made up of a message authentication code (MAC) encrypted with the personal key K CAD2 . The second right R 2 is ignored, i.e. not processed, by the first conditional access device CAD 1 but only retrieved from the rights database RDB and passed with its signature S(R 2 ) to the second conditional access device CAD 2 which is the only device of the processing unit PU configured to verify and process the second right R 2 .

According to an embodiment the first right R 1 is accompanied by a time stamp T representing a date and/or a time period such as for example an expiration date for a right to access a given broadcast program. This time stamp 1 retrieved from the rights database is associated to its signature S(T) consisting of a message authentication code (MAC) encrypted by the key K CAD1 pertaining to the first conditional access device CAD 1 . The verification of the first access conditions AC 1 includes thus an additional step of verification of conformity and integrity of the time stamp T and its signature S(T), and the comparison with a first current time CT 1 before transmitting the second right R 2 and the second part ECM 2 to the second conditional access device CAD 2 .

According to a further embodiment, the second right R 2 is accompanied by the time stamp T with the signature S(T) to be verified by the second conditional access device CAD 2 with the personal key K CAD2 pertaining to the second conditional access device CAD 2 . The verification of the second access conditions AC 2 includes thus an additional step of verification of conformity and integrity of the time stamp T and its signature S(T) and the comparison with a second current time CT 2 before releasing and loading the control word CW into the descrambler DESC.

The first current time CT 1 is generally contained in the first access conditions AC 1 and duly verified during the verification of the first access conditions AC 1 by the first conditional access device CAD 1 . In order to prevent modification of the current time, a preceding value of the current time is stored and compared with the current time CT 1 of the access conditions AC 1 . If the stored value is lower than the value received in the access conditions AC 1 , the current time CT 1 is considered as correct, i.e. in advance with the current time previously stored.

The second current time CT 2 is generally contained in the second access conditions AC 2 and duly verified during the verification of the second access conditions. The second access device CAD 2 compares the second current time CT 2 with the current time of the second access condition AC 2 in a similar way than the first conditional access device CAD 1 . The second current time CT 2 has the same value than the first current time CT 1 , but they are stored in two different places, i.e. in the second conditional access device CAD 2 , respectively in the first conditional access device CAD 1 .

Depending on configuration and security level attributed to the conditional access devices (CAD 1 , CAD 2 ), either the first right R 1 or the second right R 2 or both rights (R 1 , R 2 ) are accompanied by the time stamp T and signed by the of the respective first and second conditional access device (CAD 1 , CAD 2 ).

Only if all above mentioned verification steps have been successfully performed, the control word CW is released and loaded into the descrambler DESC. The access controlled audio/video data DATe provided by the receiving module REC are forwarded to a secured processor SCPU and to the descrambler DESC which uses the control word CW for deciphering said access controlled audio/video data DATe in order to obtain clear audio/video data (DATc) at an appropriate output of the processing unit (PU).

According to an embodiment, in particular where the descrambler DESC is detached from the second conditional access device CAD 2 , the control word CW is encrypted by a specific key Kd embedded in the descrambler DESC. The decryption of the control word CW and loading into the descrambler DESC are then carried out only if all preceding verifications have passed successfully.

According to the method of the invention, besides the knowledge of the conditional access devices common keys K 1 and K 2 , and personal keys K CAD1 and K CAD2 , two consecutive access conditions AC 1 , AC 2 must be fulfilled consecutively in function of the stored rights R 1 and R 2 for obtaining the control word CW necessary for descrambling the input audio/video data DATe.

In most of the implementations, the control messages are encrypted by the broadcaster with a transmission key KT known by the first conditional access device CAD 1 . The method therefore includes a preliminary step of decrypting the control message ECM 1 at reception by the first conditional access device CAD 1 before executing the further processing steps.

It has to be noted that in case of unsuccessful verifications carried out either on integrity or on the access condition conformity with the stored rights, the processing unit PU will block any access to the input audio/video data stream. Such events may be signaled to the user by means of appropriate error messages so that necessary updates and repairs can be made for restoring the blocked access.

A preferred embodiment of the processing unit according to the invention comprises a second conditional access device CAD 2 integrated on a single chip as a System On Chip SOC comprising a separate secured processor SCPU or a secured hardware logic controlling a hardware/software device and the descrambler DESC. The hardware/software device is configured for decrypting the second part ECM 2 of the control message ECM 1 , for verifying the second access conditions AC 2 with the second right R 2 and the integrity of said second part ECM 2 . When the verifications are successful the control word CW is released and loaded into the descrambler DESC.

The SOC configuration provides a higher security level than the software device of the first conditional access device CAD 1 through the physical protection given by the chip structure. Hacking attempts of such a chip are mostly destructive so that no sensitive data such as keys or control words can be retrieved from the integrated registers, memories or buffers. The SOC replaces a fixed or removable smart card used in other processing units.

The secured processor SCPU may also be associated to secured hardware logic dedicated to execute the different tasks of the control messages processing allowing obtaining the control word CW according to the described method and embodiments.

According to a simplified embodiment, the access conditions AC 1 and AC 2 respectively of the first part of the control message ECM 1 and of the second part ECM 2 are equivalent, i.e. AC=AC 1 =AC 2 as illustrated by FIG. 3 . The verification of the access conditions AC may be carried with both the first access control device CAD 1 and the second access control device CAD 2 with the rights R 1 and R 2 where R 1 and R 2 are equivalent, i.e. R 1 =R 2 =R. The second part of the control message ECM 2 and the right R retrieved from the rights database corresponding to the access conditions AC is then transmitted to the second access control device CAD 2 . Optionally, only the first access control device CAD 1 verifies the access conditions AC and authorizes the second access control device CAD 2 to release and load the control word CW into the descrambler DESC.

In a further embodiment the access conditions AC 2 may be a function of the first access condition AC 1 , i.e. AC 2 =F(AC 1 ) instead of being equivalent or identical to the first access conditions AC 1 . In this case, the first access device CAD 1 computes the access conditions AC 2 by applying a function F to the access conditions AC 1 and then transfers to the second access control device CAD 2 the second part of the control message ECM 2 and the right R retrieved from the rights database DBR corresponding to the resulting access conditions AC 2 =F(AC 1 ).

In an implementation, the function F simplifies the access conditions AC 1 in order to reduce time and calculations of verification carried out by the second access device CAD 2 . The function F may be a mathematical function as well as a data truncation or a data sorting function.

The advantage of these two embodiments is that the size of the control message ECM 1 is reduced as well as the bandwidth necessary for the stream to transmit the control messages ECM 1 to the processing units and secured hardware logic.

It has to be noted that the access conditions AC are not necessarily contained in the second part ECM 2 but they may be added by the first conditional access device CAD 1 to the second part ECM 2 before its transfer to the second conditional access device CAD 2 . The access conditions AC are then also authenticated with the second part ECM 2 , i.e. the access conditions AC are also included in the authentication data A 2 .

According to a further embodiment, the control message ECM 1 encrypted by a key K 1 of the first conditional access device CAD 1 and accompanied by the first authentication data A 1 contains the access conditions AC and the second part ECM 2 . This second part ECM 2 contains at least the control word CW which may be encrypted by the key K 2 of the second conditional access device CAD 2 and is accompanied by the second authentication data A 2 .

According to a further embodiment the second authentication data A 2 is a function of at least the access conditions AC received by the second conditional access device CAD 2 and of the second part ECM 2 including at least the control word CW, i.e. A 2 =F(AC, CW) or A 2 =F(AC, K 2 (CW)) if the control word CW is encrypted by the key K 2 .

Further data such as metadata MD specific for the second conditional access device CAD 2 may be added into the second part ECM 2 besides the control word CW or the encrypted control word K 2 (CW). This metadata MD may comprise headers, identifiers, parameters related to the broadcast content etc. In this case, the authentication data A 2 is also function of the metadata i.e. A 2 =F(AC, CW, MD).

In the processing method, the access conditions AC once verified by the first conditional access device CAD 1 are provided to the second conditional access device CAD 2 along with the control word CW encrypted with the key K 2 and the authentication data A 2 . Verification of the access conditions AC is also performed by the second conditional access device CAD 2 before decryption of the control word CW with the key K 2 . According to an embodiment the access conditions AC may be partially transferred to the second access condition device CAD 2 in particular in the embodiment where AC 2 =F(AC 1 ) instead of AC=AC 1 =AC 2 . The transferred part is then the most important part of the access conditions AC to be checked by the second conditional access device CAD 2 while the whole access conditions AC have already been verified by the first conditional access device CAD 1 .

As in the main embodiment, the control messages ECM 1 may be encrypted by the broadcaster with a transmission key KT, the various embodiments of the method therefore also include a preliminary step of decrypting with the key KT the control message ECM 1 at reception by the first conditional access device CAD 1 before executing the further processing steps.

In particular embodiments where the first conditional access device CAD 1 consists of a removable smart card, the connection between the first and the second conditional access device CAD 1 , CAD 2 may be secured by means of a pairing mechanism since the access conditions AC may be transferred in clear after decryption of the control message ECM 1 . A pairing key Kp encrypts all data transferred to the second conditional access device CAD 2 , i.e. the second part ECM 2 containing the control word CW encrypted by the key K 2 , the second authentication data A 2 and the right R corresponding to the access conditions AC.

Nevertheless, access conditions alone do not consist of critical or sensitive data so that the pairing may be not mandatory, but the authentication data A 2 and the right R are still verified by the second conditional access device CAD 2 .