Data communication method and system

The present invention relates to a data communication method and system that use public-key cryptography.

With the current dramatic improvements in the processing capability of information processors such as personal computers, and moreover, the accompanying expansion of the communication infrastructure, opportunities are increasing for using a network such as the Internet to transmit and receive personal information or company information. As a result, security technology has become increasingly important for concealing such information to prevent disclosure to a third party.

Common-key cryptography is known as one typical method for concealing data that are transmitted and received. In this type of cryptography, terminal devices that transmit and receive data with each other use a common key to encrypt and decode the data. With the expansion of electronic commerce such as BtoB (Business to Business) and BtoC (Business to Consumer) transactions in recent years, PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) is also receiving attention (for example, see Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-216270).

In public-key cryptography that is known as the basic PKI technology, a public key is used to encrypt transmission data, and a secret key that is a pair with the public key but that is not published is used to decode the received data. This public key cryptography uses different keys on the transmission side and reception side and therefore increases the level of security over that of the above-described common-key cryptography. However, the public-key cryptography requires a relatively long time for the processes of encrypting and decoding data, and common-key cryptography is therefore generally more appropriate for data communication with a specific partner.

A technique for increasing the level of concealment achieved by the above-described public key and secret key (PKI key) is disclosed in, for example, Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2001-357371. In this technique, the user's fingerprint is read and a random number that is obtained from the fingerprint is used to encrypt the PKI key itself.

In the above-described common-key cryptography, both the transmission-side terminal device that encrypts data and the reception-side terminal device that decodes the data must have a common key, and a user that transmits data by way of a network must deliver the common key to the communication partner by some method. In data communication systems in recent years, the above-described public-key cryptography is used as a means for more safely delivering a common key.

However, in a method for transmitting a common key by public-key cryptography, the common key itself, although encrypted, is released onto the network, and the danger therefore exists that a third party with malicious intent may appropriate the common key.

Alternatively, when data are transmitted and received using only public-key cryptography, the secret key must similarly be delivered to the communication partner, and as a result, there is a danger that the secret key may be stolen by a third party having malicious intent when the network is used to deliver the secret key.

In other words, data communication systems of the prior art suffered from the problem that the risk of interception of a common key or secret key must always be kept in mind.

It is an object of the present invention to provide a data communication method and system that use public-key cryptography that can raise the level of concealment of data that are transmitted and received by way of a network and thus improve the level of security.

In the present invention for achieving the above-described object, biometrics data in which biological information of users is converted to numerical values are used to authenticate users that transmit and receive data, and based on the biometrics data, the same secret key (common secret key) are generated at each of the user terminal devices used by users.

The data communication method and system that use the public-key cryptography of the present invention eliminate the need to release common secret keys onto the Internet and thus reduce the risk of interception of secret keys. In particular, the biometrics data are different bit sequences for each extraction, and the common secret keys that are generated based on the biometrics data therefore also differ for each instance and thus have validity only as one-time keys. As a result, the level of security of communication realized by public-key cryptography that uses these common secret keys is improved.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the first embodiment of the data communication system of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of the PKI server device shown in FIG. 1 .

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing another example of the configuration of the first user terminal device shown in FIG. 1 .

FIG. 4 is a flow chart showing the succession of processes of the first embodiment of the data communication system of the present invention.

FIG. 5 is a flow chart showing the succession of processes of the second embodiment of the data communication system of the present invention.

FIG. 6 is a flow chart showing the succession of processes of the third embodiment of the data communication system of the present invention.

FIG. 7 is a flow chart showing the succession of processes of the fourth embodiment of the data communication system of the present invention.

Explanation next regards the present invention with reference to the accompanying figures.

First Embodiment

The data communication system of the first embodiment realizes public-key cryptography by means of PKI without releasing secret keys to the network by both using biometrics data in which biological information of a user such as a fingerprint, iris, veins, handwriting, signature, hand or face shapes is converted to numerical values to authenticate users that transmit and receive data and, based on the biometrics data, generating the same secret key (common secret key) on each of user terminal devices that are used by the users.

Biometrics data normally cannot obtain exactly the same bit sequence with each extraction, and the determination of whether an individual is in fact a user is realized by means of the similarity between biometrics data that have been extracted (hereinbelow referred to as “inquiry data”) and biometrics data that have been registered in advance (hereinbelow referred to as “registration data”). Accordingly, when inquiry data are used that have a bit sequence that is absolutely identical to that of inquiry data that were used in the past, there is a high possibility that a third party having malicious intent is posing as a user.

In the present embodiment, each user terminal device uses biometrics data having these properties to generate a common secret key, which is a one-time key, with each communication with a specific partner, whereby the level of concealment of data that are transmitted and received is improved.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the configuration of the first embodiment of the data communication system of the present invention, and FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the configuration of the PKI server device that is shown in FIG. 1 .

As shown in FIG. 1 , the data communication system of the first embodiment is of a configuration that includes: first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 that are used by users for transmitting and receiving data, these user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 being provided with biometrics acquisition device for acquiring biometrics data of the users; and PKI server device 4 that implements: registration of biometrics data that are transmitted from first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 , authentication of each user that uses biometrics data, verification of the validity of registration data and inquiry data used in authentication, and transmission and reception of data that have been encrypted among each of the user terminal devices using public-key cryptography realized by PKI. First user terminal device 1 1 , second user terminal device 1 2 , and PKI server device 4 are connected so as to allow intercommunication by way of network 5 such as the Internet. A configuration is shown in FIG. 1 in which one PKI server device 4 is connected to network 5 , but PKI server device 4 may be of a configuration that realizes various functions by means of a plurality of server devices.

PKI server device 4 is an information processor such as a workstation/server computer that is provided with communication capabilities for connecting to network 5 , and is managed by, for example, a service provider that manages the data communication system of the present invention, or by a third party that is entrusted by the company with the operation of the data communication system. First user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 are information processors such as personal computers, PDAs (Personal Digital (Data) Assistants) or portable telephones provided with communication capabilities for connecting to network 5 . Biometrics acquisition device 2 1 for acquiring biometrics data of users is connected to first user terminal device 1 1 , and biometrics acquisition device 2 2 is connected to second user terminal device 1 2 .

As shown in FIG. 2 , PKI server device 4 is of a configuration that includes: processor 10 for executing processes in accordance with programs, input device 20 for applying input such as commands and data to processor 10 , and output device 30 for monitoring the processing results of processor 10 .

Processor 10 is of a configuration provided with: CPU 11 , main memory device 12 for temporarily holding data necessary for the processing of CPU 11 , data storage device 14 for storing information such as PKI keys and biometrics data of each user, recording medium 13 in which are stored control programs for causing CPU 11 to execute processes of the present invention, memory control interface unit 15 for controlling the transfer of data between CPU 11 and main memory device 12 , recording medium 13 , and data storage device 14 , I/O interface unit 16 that is the interface device with input device 20 and output device 30 , and communication control device 17 that is the interface for controlling communication by way of the network; these components each being connected by way of bus 18 .

Processor 10 executes processes of the present invention that are to be described hereinbelow in accordance with a control program that has been recorded in recording medium 13 . Recording medium 13 may be a magnetic disk, a semiconductor memory, an optical disk, or another recording medium.

First user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 are of a configuration that is basically the same as the configuration of PKI server device 4 with the exception of: the provision of biometrics acquisition device, and moreover, differences in the information stored in data storage device. Accordingly, detailed explanation of this configuration is here omitted.

As shown in FIG. 1 , PKI server device 4 is of a configuration provided with authentication unit 6 for implementing a user authentication process using data received from first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 , and PKI processor 7 for transmitting and receiving data that have been encrypted between user terminal devices using public-key cryptography by means of PKI; the functions of authentication unit 6 and PKI processor 7 being realized by the above-described processor 10 . Data storage device 14 of PKI server device 4 is provided with: biometrics database 6 1 in which the biometrics data of each user are registered and biometrics data lapsed list 6 2 in which are registered biometrics data for which validity has been lost and that therefore cannot be used, this database and list being used in the above-described authentication unit 6 ; and repository 7 1 in which are stored PKI public keys used when transmitting or receiving data with each user terminal device, and PKI secret key storage unit 7 2 in which are stored PKI secret keys, this repository and storage unit being used in the above described PKI processor 7 .

As described in the foregoing explanation, biometrics acquisition devices 2 1 and 2 2 for acquiring the biometrics data of users are connected to first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 , respectively; and in memory devices 3 1 and 3 2 in the biometrics acquisition devices are stored, for example: inquiry data, registration data, PKI keys that are used when transmitting data to and receiving data from a PKI server device, and the common secret keys that are used when receiving data from the user terminal device that is the communication partner. The inquiry data, registration data, PKI keys and common secret keys may also be stored in the data storage devices that belong to first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 .

As shown in FIG. 3 , biometrics acquisition devices 2 1 and 2 2 may also be incorporated in first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 , respectively. In this case, inquiry data, registration data, PKI keys and common secret keys may be stored in memory devices in biometrics acquisition devices 2 1 and 2 2 (see FIG. 3( a )), or may be stored in data storage device 8 that belongs to first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 (see FIG. 3( b )). FIG. 3 shows only a modification of first user terminal device 1 1 .

The inquiry data, registration data, PKI keys, and common secret keys may also be stored on another external recording medium that can be connected to each user terminal device such as: an IC card, a hard disk device, a floppy disk, a CD (Compact Disk), a magneto-optic disk, a DVD (Digital Video Disk), a USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory, an SD memory card, or a memory stick.

In this case, PKI public key A is the public key that is used when transmitting data from PKI server device 4 to first user terminal device 1 1 used by user A, PKI public key B is the public key used when transmitting data to second user terminal device 1 2 used by user B, and PKI public key S is the public key used when transmitting data to PKI server device 4 from first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 . In addition, PKI secret key A is the secret key used when decoding data that have been transmitted from PKI server device 4 to first user terminal device 1 1 that is used by user A, PKI secret key B is the secret key used when decoding data that have been transmitted from PKI server device 4 to second user terminal device 1 2 used by user B, and PKI secret key S is the secret key used when decoding data that have been transmitted to PKI server device 4 from first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 .

Further, common secret key KA is the secret key used when decoding data that have been transmitted from second user terminal device 1 2 to first user terminal device 1 1 , and common secret key KB is the secret key used when decoding data that have been transmitted from first user terminal device 1 1 to second user terminal device 1 2 .

Using FIG. 4 , the following explanation regards the succession of processes of the data communication method of the first embodiment shown in FIG. 1 .

As shown in FIG. 4 , in the first embodiment, before the transmission and reception of data between user A and user B, one user such as user A carries out operations for transmitting a request to produce a common secret key from first user terminal device 1 1 to second user terminal device 1 2 that belongs to user B (Step A 01 ). At second user terminal device 1 2 , upon receiving the request to produce a common secret key from first user terminal device 1 1 , user B implements operations to respond with an acceptance of the request to first user terminal device 1 1 (Step A 02 ).

At first user terminal device 1 1 , user A next implements operations to use biometrics acquisition device 2 1 to acquire biometrics data of user A, and biometrics data (inquiry data) Ma are both stored in a prescribed memory device and transmitted to PKI server device 4 with appended information of user A and the communication partner (user B) (Step A 03 ). At this time, first user terminal device 1 1 may use PKI public key S to encrypt data that are transmitted to conceal inquiry data Ma of user A.

Similarly, in second user terminal device 1 2 that has accepted the request to produce a common secret key, user B implements operations to use biometrics acquisition device 2 2 to acquire the biometrics data of user B, and the biometrics data (inquiry data) Mb are stored in a prescribed memory device, and further, the biometrics data (inquiry data) Mb are transmitted to PKI server device 4 with appended information of user B and the communication partner (user A) (Step A 04 ). At this time, second user terminal device 1 2 may use PKI public key S to encrypt the data that are transmitted to conceal inquiry data Mb of user B.

Upon receiving the biometrics data of user A from first user terminal device 1 1 (Step A 05 ), PKI server device 4 first determines whether the received data have been encrypted or not. If the received data have been encrypted, PKI server device 4 uses PKI secret key S to decode the received data.

Upon acquiring inquiry data Ma of user A by decoding, PKI server device 4 reads registration data Ra of user A that have been registered in biometrics database 6 1 , compares this registration data Ra with inquiry data Ma that have been received (Step A 06 ), and determines whether the bit sequence are absolutely identical or not (Step A 07 ).

If the registration data Ra and the inquiry data Ma are absolutely identical bit sequences, PKI server device 4 determines that inquiry data Ma that have been transmitted from first user terminal device 1 1 as described above are data that have been stolen in the past, i.e., determines that this is an access from a third party other than user A, and therefore stores the registration data Ra of user A to biometrics data lapsed list 6 2 (Step A 08 ) and ends the process. If registration data Ra and inquiry data Ma are different bit sequences, PKI server device 4 matches inquiry data Ma with registration data Ra (Step A 09 ).

PKI server device 4 also uses PKI secret key S as necessary to decode for inquiry data Mb of user B that is received from second user terminal device 1 2 . PKI server device 4 then compares inquiry data Mb and registration data Rb to determine whether these bit sequences are absolutely identical or not, and if they are identical, stores registration data Rb of user B to biometrics data lapsed list 6 2 and ends the process. Alternatively, if registration data Rb and inquiry data Mb are different bit sequences, PKI server device 4 matches received inquiry data Mb with registration data Rb.

If the matching of user A results in success, i.e., if inquiry data Ma is recognized to be data of user A (Step A 10 ), PKI server device 4 calculates similarity information SA 1 indicating the degree of similarity based on registration data Ra and inquiry data Ma of user A (Step A 11 ). When matching results in failure, PKI server device 4 ends the process. The calculation of similarity information may use values (hereinbelow referred to as “score information”) obtained by adding up the “pairing strengths” for each prescribed feature point disclosed in, for example “Automated fingerprint identification by minutiae-network features—Matching process,” in Transactions of IEICE D-II, J72-D-II, 5, pp. 733-740, May 1989 (in Japanese).

More specifically, where SA 1 rr is the score information for the registration data Ra of user A compared to itself, SA 1 mm is the score information for inquiry data Ma of user A compared to itself, and SA 1 rm is the score information for registration data Ra and inquiry data Ma of user A, the similarity information SA 1 of user A is calculated using a prescribed function F 1 by:

SA 1 =F 1( SA 1 rr,SA 1 mm,SA 1 rm )

The method of calculating similarity information SA 1 is not limited to the above-described method, and similarity information SA 1 may be also calculated using the registration data Ra and the inquiry data Ma of user A by another known method, and the value that has been found may be further converted to another value using a prescribed function.

PKI server device 4 similarly calculates similarity information SB 1 based on the registration data Rb and inquiry data Mb of user B when matching of user B results in success, i.e., when inquiry data Rb is recognized as that of user B. When matching results in failure, PKI server device 4 terminates the process.

As with the above-described method of calculating similarity information SA 1 of user A, similarity information SB 1 of user B is calculated using a prescribed function F 1 from:

SB 1 =F 1( SB 1 rr,SB 1 mm,SB 1 rm )

where SB 1 rr is the score information for registration data Rb of user B compared to itself, SB 1 mm is the score information of inquiry data Mb of user B compared to itself, and SB 1 rm is the score information of the registration data Rb and inquiry data Mb of user B.

Having calculated similarity information SA 1 and SB 1 , PKI server device 4 uses PKI public key A to encrypt registration data Ra of user A and similarity information SB 1 of user B, and transmits the result to first user terminal device 1 1 . In addition, PKI server device 4 uses PKI public key B to encrypt registration data Rb of user B and similarity information SA 1 of user A and transmits the result to second user terminal device 1 2 (Step A 12 ).

First user terminal device 1 1 uses PKI secret key A to decode the data that have been received from PKI server device 4 , and thus acquires each of the registration data Ra of user A and similarity information SB 1 of user B (Step A 13 ). First user terminal device 1 1 then uses registration data Ra of user A and the inquiry data Ma of user A that have been stored in a prescribed memory device to calculate similarity information SA 2 (Step A 14 ).

Similar to PKI server device 4 , similarity information SA 2 is calculated using a prescribed function F 1 from:

SA 2 =F 1( SA 1 rr,SA 1 mm,SA 1 rm )

where, for example, SA 1 rr is the score information for registration data Ra of user A compared with itself, SA 1 mm is the score information of inquiry data Ma of user A compared with itself, and SA 1 rm is the score information for registration data Ra and inquiry data Ma of user A. Common secret key KA, which is used in the transmission and reception of data with second user terminal device 1 2 , is generated based on this similarity information SA 2 and similarity information SB 1 of user B that have been received from PKI server device 4 (Step A 15 ). Common secret key KA is generated using similarity information SA 2 and SB 1 by means of a prescribed function F 2 (SA 2 , SB 1 ).

Similarly, second user terminal device 1 2 uses PKI secret key B to decode data that have been received from PKI server device 4 and acquires each of registration data Rb of user B and similarity information SA 1 of user A (Step A 16 ). Second user terminal device 1 2 then uses registration data Rb of user B and inquiry data Mb of user B that have been stored in a prescribed memory device to calculate similarity information SB 2 (Step A 17 ).

Similar to PKI server device 4 , similarity information SB 2 is calculated using a prescribed function F 1 from:

SB 2 =F 1( SB 1 rr,SB 1 mm,SB 1 rm )

where, for example, SB 1 rr is the score information for registration data Rb of user B compared with itself, SB 1 mm is score information for inquiry data Mb of user B compared with itself, and SB 1 rm is the score information for registration data Rb and inquiry data Mb of user B. Common secret key KB, which is used in the transmission and reception of data with first user terminal device 1 1 , is generated based on this similarity information SB 2 and similarity information SA 1 of user A that has been received from PKI server device 4 (Step A 18 ). Common secret key KB is generated using similarity information SB 2 and SA 1 from a prescribed function F 2 (SA 1 , SB 2 ).

Here, if the same function F 1 and function F 2 are used in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 , and moreover, if there has been no corruption of data that have been transmitted and received in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 , common secret key KA and common secret key KB will be equal. Accordingly, a common secret key is generated that can be used only in first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 .

First user terminal device 1 1 subsequently transmits data that have been encrypted using common secret key KA to second user terminal device 1 2 , and second user terminal device 1 2 uses common secret key KB to decode the received data. Similarly, second user terminal device 1 2 transmits data that have been encrypted using common secret key KB to first user terminal device 1 1 , and first user terminal device 1 1 uses common secret key KA to decode the received data. As a result, first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 are able to transmit and receive data by means of a public-key cryptography that uses a common secret key that is concealed.

According to the data communication method and system of the present embodiment, user terminal devices that transmit and receive data both use each of the items of similarity information that are obtained from biometrics data to each generate a common secret key, whereby the common secret key need not be released onto network 5 . The risk of interception of the key on network 5 is therefore reduced.

In addition, the biometrics data have bit sequences that differ with each extraction, and the common secret key that is generated based on biometrics data therefore also differs with each communication and has validity only as a one-time key. Public-key cryptography that uses this common secret key can therefore realize an improved level of security in communication.

Second Embodiment

Explanation next regards the second embodiment of the data communication method and system of the present invention with reference to the accompanying figures.

The second embodiment is of a configuration in which biometrics data (registration data) have been registered in advance not only in the PKI server device, but also in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 or in biometrics acquisition devices 2 1 and 2 2 . As a result, the second embodiment differs from the first embodiment in that registration data are not transmitted from PKI server device 4 to each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 . The configuration of the data communication system is similar to that of the first embodiment, and explanation of the system is therefore here omitted.

FIG. 5 is a flow chart showing the succession of processes of the second embodiment of the data communication method of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 5 , in the second embodiment, before the transmission and reception of data of user A and user B, a user such as user A implements operations to transmit a request from first user terminal device 1 1 to second user terminal device 1 2 that belongs to user B to produce a common secret key (Step B 01 ). Upon receiving the request to produce a common secret key from first user terminal device 1 1 , user B implements operations in second user terminal device 1 2 to return an acceptance of the request to first user terminal device 1 1 (Step B 02 ).

User A next implements operations in first user terminal device 1 1 such that biometrics acquisition device 2 1 is used to acquire biometrics data of user A, and biometrics data (inquiry data) Ma are both stored in a prescribed memory device and transmitted to PKI server device 4 with information of user A and the communication partner (user B) appended (Step B 03 ). At this time, first user terminal device 1 1 may use PKI public key S to encrypt data that are transmitted to conceal inquiry data Ma of user A.

Similarly, in second user terminal device 1 2 that has accepted the request to produce a common secret key, user B implements operations such that biometrics acquisition device 2 2 is used to acquire the biometrics data of user B, and biometrics data (inquiry data) Mb are both stored in a prescribed memory device and transmitted to PKI server device 4 with information of user B and the communication partner (user A) appended (Step B 04 ). At this time, second user terminal device 1 2 may use PKI public key S to encrypt the transmitted data to conceal inquiry data Mb of user B.

Upon receiving the biometrics data of user A from first user terminal device 1 1 (Step B 05 ), PKI server device 4 first determines whether the received data have been encrypted or not. If the received data have been encrypted, PKI server device 4 uses PKI secret key S to decode the received data.

Upon acquiring inquiry data Ma of user A by decoding, PKI server device 4 reads registration data Ra of user A that have been registered in advance in biometrics database 6 1 , compares this registration data Ra with inquiry data Ma that have been received (Step B 06 ), and determines whether the bit sequences are absolutely identical or not (Step B 07 ).

When registration data Ra and inquiry data Ma are here absolutely identical bit sequences, PKI server device 4 : determines that inquiry data Ma that have been transmitted from first user terminal device 1 1 as previously described are data that have been stolen in the past, i.e., that this is an access from a third party other than user A; stores registration data Ra of user A to biometrics data lapsed list 6 2 (Step B 08 ); and ends the process. When registration data Ra and inquiry data Ma are different bit sequences, PKI server device 4 matches inquiry data Ma and registration data Ra (Step B 09 ).

PKI server device 4 also uses PKI secret key S as necessary to carry out decoding for inquiry data Mb of user B that have been received from second user terminal device 1 2 . PKI server device 4 then compares inquiry data Mb with registration data Rb to determine whether these bit sequences are absolutely identical, and if the bit sequences are the same, stores registration data Rb of user B to biometrics data lapsed list 6 2 and ends the process. Alternatively, if the bit sequences are not identical, PKI server device 4 matches inquiry data Mb that has been received with registration data Rb.

When the matching of user A results in success, i.e., when inquiry data Ra are recognized to be that of user A (Step B 10 ), PKI server device 4 calculates similarity information SA 1 from registration data Ra of user A and inquiry data Ma (Step B 11 ). At this time, similarity information SA 1 of user A is calculated by using prescribed function F 1 (SA 1 rr , SA 1 mm , SA 1 rm ), as in the first embodiment (Step B 09 ). When matching results in failure, PKI server device 4 ends the process.

Similarly, when matching results in success, i.e., when inquiry data Rb is recognized to be data of user B, PKI server device 4 calculates similarity information SB 1 from registration data Rb of user B and inquiry data Mb. At this time, PKI server device 4 uses a prescribed function F 1 (SB 1 rr , SB 1 mm , SB 1 rm ) to calculate similarity information SB 1 of user B as in the first embodiment. When matching results in a failure, PKI server device 4 ends the process.

PKI server device 4 , having calculated similarity information SA 1 and SB 1 , uses PKI public key A to encrypt similarity information SB 1 of user B, and transmits the result to first user terminal device 1 1 (Step B 12 ). PKI server device 4 further uses PKI public key B to encrypt similarity information SA 1 of user A and transmits the result to second user terminal device 1 2 .

First user terminal device 1 1 uses PKI secret key A to decode the data that have been received from PKI server device 4 and thus acquires similarity information SB 1 of user B (Step B 13 ). First user terminal device 1 1 then uses registration data Ra of user A that have been stored in advance in a prescribed memory device and inquiry data Ma of user A to calculate similarity information SA 2 (Step B 14 ).

As in the first embodiment, similarity information SA 2 is calculated using a prescribed function F 1 (SA 1 rr , SA 1 mm , SA 1 rm ). Common secret key KA that is used for transmitting and receiving data with second user terminal device 1 2 is generated based on this similarity information SA 2 and similarity information SB 1 of user B that has been received from the PKI server device (Step B 15 ). As in the first embodiment, similarity information SA 2 and SB 1 are used to generate common secret key KA using a prescribed function F 2 (SA 2 , SB 1 ).

Similarly, second user terminal device 1 2 uses PKI secret key B to decode data that have been received from PKI server device 4 and thus acquires similarity information SA 1 of user A (Step B 16 ). Second user terminal device 1 2 then uses registration data Rb of user B that have been stored in advance in a prescribed memory device and inquiry data Mb of user B to calculate similarity information SB 2 (Step B 17 ).

Similarity information SB 2 is calculated using a prescribed function F 1 (SB 1 rr , SB 1 mm , SB 1 rm ) as in the first embodiment. Common secret key KB that is used in the transmission and reception of data with first user terminal device 1 1 is generated based on this similarity information SB 2 and similarity information SA 1 of user A that has been received from PKI server device 4 (Step B 18 ). As in the first embodiment, similarity information SB 2 and SA 1 are used to generate common secret key KB using a prescribed function F 2 (SA 1 , SB 2 ).

Here, if the same function F 1 and function F 2 are used in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 , and moreover, there is no corruption of the data that are transmitted and received in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 , common secret key KA and common secret key KB will be equal. Accordingly, common secret keys are generated that can be used only in first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 , as in the first embodiment.

First user terminal device 1 1 subsequently transmits data that have been encrypted using common secret key KA to second user terminal device 1 2 , and second user terminal device 1 2 uses the common secret key KB to decode the received data. In the same way, second user terminal device 1 2 transmits data that have been encrypted by common secret key KB to first user terminal device 1 1 , and first user terminal device 1 1 uses common secret key KA to decode the data that have been received. As a result, first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 can transmit and receive data by means of public-key cryptography using common secret keys that have been concealed.

According to the data communication method and system of the present embodiment, biometrics data (registration data) of users are registered in advance in user terminal devices or biometrics acquisition devices to eliminate the need for releasing registration data onto a network, whereby, in addition to the same effect of the first embodiment, the danger of interception of registration data by a third party is reduced.

Third Embodiment

Explanation next regards the third embodiment of the data communication method and system of the present invention with reference to the accompanying figures.

In the third embodiment, biometrics data of users (registration data) are registered in advance in first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 (or biometrics acquisition devices 2 1 and 2 2 ), inquiry data are matched with registration data in each of user terminal device 1 1 and 1 2 , and registration data and inquiry data are transmitted to PKI server device 4 when matching is successful. PKI server device 4 then, based on the bit sequences of inquiry data and registration data that have been transmitted from user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 , authenticates the users that have transmitted these data. The configuration of the data communication system is identical to that of the first embodiment, and explanation of this configuration is therefore here omitted.

FIG. 6 is a flow chart showing the succession of processes of the third embodiment of the data communication method of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 6 , in the third embodiment, before transmitting and receiving data of user A and user B, one user such as user A implements operations to transmit a request from first user terminal device 1 1 to second user terminal device 1 2 that belongs to user B to produce a common secret key (Step C 01 ). When second user terminal device 1 2 receives the request from first user terminal device 1 1 to produce a common secret key, user B implements operations to return an acceptance of the request to first user terminal device 1 1 (Step C 02 ).

In first user terminal device 1 1 , user A next implements operations to use biometrics acquisition device 2 1 to acquire the biometrics data of user A (Step C 03 ), whereby biometrics data (inquiry data) Ma are both stored in a prescribed memory device and matched with registration data Ra that have been stored in advance in the memory device (Step C 04 ). If matching results in success, i.e., if inquiry data Ma are recognized to be of user A (Step C 08 ), first user terminal device 1 1 transmits registration data Ra, inquiry data Ma, and the information of user A and the communication partner (user B) to PKI server device 4 (Step C 09 ). At this time, first user terminal device 1 1 may use PKI public key S to encrypt the data that are transmitted to conceal these items of information relating to user A. If matching results in failure, first user terminal device 1 1 ends the process.

Similarly, in second user terminal device 1 2 that has accepted the request to produce a common secret key, user B implements operations to use biometrics acquisition device 2 2 to acquire biometrics data of user B (Step C 06 ) and both store these biometrics data (inquiry data) Mb in a prescribed memory device and match with registration data Rb that have been stored in advance in the memory device (Step C 07 ). If matching results in success, i.e., if inquiry data Mb are recognized to be data of user B (Step C 10 ), second user terminal device 1 2 transmits registration data Rb, inquiry data Mb, and information of user B and the communication partner (user A) to PKI server device 4 (Step C 11 ). At this time, second user terminal device 1 2 may use PKI public key S to encrypt these data that are transmitted to conceal the information that relates to user B. If matching results in failure, second user terminal device 1 2 ends the process.

Upon receiving information that contains inquiry data Ma and registration data Ra of user A from first user terminal device 1 1 (Step C 12 ), PKI server device 4 first determines whether the received data have been encrypted or not. If the received data have been encrypted, PKI server device 4 uses PKI secret key S to decode the received data.

Upon acquiring registration data Ra and inquiry data Ma of user A by decoding, PKI server device 4 first searches biometrics data lapsed list 6 2 (Step C 13 ), and determines whether data exist that have bit sequences absolutely identical to received inquiry data Ma (Step C 14 ). If data exist in biometrics data lapsed list 6 2 having bit sequences absolutely identical to inquiry data Ma, PKI server device 4 determines that inquiry data Ma received from first user terminal device 1 1 are fraudulent and terminates the process. If data in which bit sequence absolutely identical to inquiry data Ma is not present, PKI server device 4 registers these inquiry data Ma in biometrics data lapsed list 6 2 to prevent access (posing) that uses these inquiry data Ma (Step C 15 ).

PKI server device 4 next searches within biometrics database 6 1 (Step C 16 ), and determines whether data in which bit sequence absolutely identical to the received registration data Ra is present (Step C 17 ). If data in which bit sequence absolutely identical to registration data Ra do not exist in biometrics database 6 1 , PKI server device 4 determines that the access from first user terminal device 1 1 is not access of user A (failure of personal authentication) and terminates the process.

If data in which bit sequence absolutely identical to registration data Ra is present in biometrics database 6 1 , PKI server device 4 determines that the received registration data Ra and inquiry data Ma are the data of user A (success of personal authentication) and calculates similarity information SA 1 of user A as in the first embodiment (Step C 18 ).

PKI server device 4 carries out the same processes as described above (Step C 12 -Step C 18 ) for data that are received from second user terminal device 1 2 , determines that received registration data Rb and inquiry data Mb are data of user B, and if the personal authentication succeeds, calculates similarity information SB 1 of user B as in the first embodiment.

PKI server device 4 , having calculated similarity information SA 1 and SB 1 , uses PKI public key A to encrypt similarity information SB 1 of user B that has been calculated and transmits the result to first user terminal device 1 1 (Step C 19 ). PKI server device 4 further uses PKI public key B to encrypt similarity information SA 1 of user A and transmits the result to second user terminal device 1 2 .

First user terminal device 1 1 uses PKI secret key A to decode the data that have been received from PKI server device 4 and thus acquires similarity information SB 1 of user B (Step C 20 ). First user terminal device 1 1 then uses inquiry data Ma of user A and registration data Ra of user A that have been stored in advance in a prescribed memory device to calculate similarity information SA 2 (Step C 21 ).

Similarity information SA 2 is calculated using a prescribed function F 1 (SA 1 rr , SA 1 mm , SA 1 rm ) as in the first embodiment. Common secret key KA that is used in first user terminal device 1 1 is generated based on this similarity information SA 2 and similarity information SB 1 of user B that has been received from the PKI server device (Step C 22 ). Common secret key KA is generated by means of prescribed function F 2 (SA 2 , SB 1 ) using similarity information SA 2 and SB 1 as in the first embodiment.

In the same way, second user terminal device 1 2 uses PKI secret key B to decode data that have been received from PKI server device 4 and thus acquires similarity information SA 1 of user A (Step C 23 ). Second user terminal device 1 2 then uses inquiry data Mb of user B and registration data Rb of user B that have been stored in advance in a prescribed memory device to calculate similarity information SB 2 (Step C 24 ).

Similarity information SB 2 is calculated using a prescribed function F 1 (SB 1 rr , SB 1 mm , SB 1 rm ) as in the first embodiment. Common secret key KB that is used in second user terminal device 1 2 is generated based on this similarity information SB 2 and similarity information SA 1 of user A that has been received from PKI server device 4 (Step C 25 ). Common secret key KB is generated by means of a prescribed function F 2 (SA 1 , SB 2 ) using similarity information SB 2 and SA 1 , as in the first embodiment.

In this case, if the same function F 1 and function F 2 are used in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 , and moreover, data that are transmitted and received in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 have not been corrupted, common secret key KA and common secret key KB will be equivalent. Accordingly, common secret keys are generated that can be used only in first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 , as in the first embodiment.

First user terminal device 1 1 subsequently transmits data that have been encrypted using common secret key KA to second user terminal device 1 2 , and second user terminal device 1 2 uses common secret key KB to decode the data that have been received. Similarly, second user terminal device 1 2 transmits data that have been encrypted using common secret key KB to first user terminal device 1 1 , and first user terminal device 1 1 uses common secret key KA to decode the data that have been received. As a result, first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 are able to transmit and receive data realized by public-key cryptography that uses common secret keys that have been concealed.

According to the data communication method and system of the third embodiment, in addition to the same effects as the first embodiment, the authentication accuracy of users can be improved and posing by a third party having malicious intent can be more reliably prevented because the authentication of users is carried out in PKI server device 4 based on the bit sequences of registration data and inquiry data that have been transmitted from user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 .

Fourth Embodiment

Explanation next regards the fourth embodiment of the data communication method and system of the present invention with reference to the accompanying figures.

In the fourth embodiment, as in the third embodiment, biometrics data (registration data) of users are registered in advance in first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 (or in biometrics acquisition devices 2 1 and 2 2 ), inquiry data are matched with registration data in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 , and the registration data and inquiry data are transmitted to PKI server device 4 when matching is successful. PKI server device 4 authenticates users for which these data have been transmitted based on the bit sequences of the inquiry data and registration data that have been transmitted from each of user terminal device 1 1 and 1 2 .

The fourth embodiment is an example of a configuration that enables operation similar to the third embodiment for cases in which the registration data that have been registered in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 are data of poor quality that cannot be used in matching. If the determination of whether the data are of poor quality is carried out, for example, at the time of registration of biometrics data to first user terminal device 1 1 and second user terminal device 1 2 , and if a flag indicating poor quality is appended to registration data that have been determined to be of poor quality, the processing for determining whether data are of poor quality each time the registration data are read can be reduced. The configuration of the data communication system is the same as in the first embodiment and explanation of the configuration is therefore here omitted.

FIG. 7 is a flow chart showing the succession of processes of the fourth embodiment of the data communication method of the present invention. FIG. 7 shows only the processes of first user terminal device 1 1 and PKI server device 4 , but second user terminal device 1 2 executes the same processes as first user terminal device 1 1 with the exception of the process of first responding to the request to produce a common secret key from first user terminal device 1 1 .

As shown in FIG. 7 , in the fourth embodiment, before the transmission and reception of data of user A and user B, one user such as user A implements operations to transmit a request to produce a common secret key from first user terminal device 1 1 to second user terminal device that belongs to user B (Step D 01 ). Upon receiving the request to produce a common secret key from first user terminal device 1 1 , user B implements operations such that second user terminal device 1 2 responds to first user terminal device 1 1 with an acceptance of the request (not shown).

In first user terminal device 1 1 , user A next implements operations to use biometrics acquisition device 2 1 to acquire biometrics data of user A (Step D 02 ), and these biometrics data (inquiry data) Ma are stored in a prescribed memory device and the quality of registration data Ra stored in advance in the memory device is checked (Step D 04 ). If registration data Ra are of quality that allows use in matching, inquiry data Ma that have been acquired by biometrics acquisition device 2 1 are matched with the registration data Ra (Step D 05 ). If matching results in success, i.e., if inquiry data Ma are recognized to be data of user A (Step D 06 ), first user terminal device 1 1 transmits registration data Ra, inquiry data Ma, and information of user A and the communication partner (user B) to PKI server device 4 (Step D 07 ). In the present embodiment, moreover, even when registration data Ra are data of poor quality and thus cannot used in matching, the first user terminal device proceeds to the process of Step D 07 and transmits registration data Ra, inquiry data Ma, and information of user A and the communication partner (user B) to PKI server device 4 . At this time, first user terminal device 1 1 may use PKI public key S to encrypt the data that are transmitted to conceal these data that relate to user A.

Similarly, in second user terminal device 1 2 that has accepted the request to produce a common secret key, user B implements operations to use biometrics acquisition device 2 2 to acquire biometrics data of user B, and the biometrics data (inquiry data) Mb are stored in the prescribed memory device and the quality of registration data Rb that have been stored in advance in the memory device is checked. If registration data Rb are of quality that can be used in matching, inquiry data Mb that have been acquired in the biometrics acquisition device are matched with registration data Rb. If matching results in success, i.e., if inquiry data Mb are recognized as data of user B, second user terminal device 1 2 transmits registration data Rb, inquiry data Mb, and information of user B and the communication partner (user A) to PKI server device 4 . Alternatively, even when registration data Rb are poor quality data that do not have quality for use in matching, second user terminal device 1 2 transmits registration data Rb, inquiry data Mb, and information of user B and the communication partner (user A) to PKI server device 4 . At this time, second user terminal device 1 2 may also use PKI public key S to encrypt the data that are transmitted to conceal the information that relates to user B.

The subsequent processes are equivalent to the processes of Steps C 12 -C 25 of the third embodiment shown in FIG. 6 , and explanation of these processes is therefore here omitted.

According to the data communication method and system of the fourth embodiment, as in the third embodiment, PKI server device 4 authenticates the identity of a user based on the bit sequences of the registration data and inquiry data that are transmitted from each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 , whereby the accuracy of authentication of users can be improved and posing as a user by a third party with malicious intent can be more reliably prevented. In addition, operation similar to the third embodiment can be realized even when registration data cannot be used to realize matching in each of user terminal devices 1 1 and 1 2 .

Although examples were shown in the above-described first to fourth embodiments in which each of PKI server device 4 , first user terminal device 1 1 , and second user terminal device 1 2 were of a configuration realized by a processor that included a CPU for carrying out processing in accordance with programs, PKI server device 4 , first user terminal device 1 1 , and second user terminal device 1 2 are not limited to this configuration and may be of a configuration for realizing the same functions as described above by means of a plurality of LSI that include, for example, logic circuits and memory.