Secure inter-company collaboration environment

The present invention relates generally to communications and, more specifically, to implementation of a secure inter-company collaboration environment.

Design and development projects naturally require a certain degree of collaboration among the projects' participants. Complex projects and projects in technological areas requiring high expertise, such as developing, maintaining and operating IC (integrated circuit) design environments or co-developing IC's, typically require a high degree of collaboration and communication. In cases in which more than one company work together on a project, the challenges are greater with respect to providing engineering teams with the efficiency of working together as if they are one company, while providing the security necessitated by the fact that they are not one company. For example, updating and maintaining a design environment has become more and more complex with diminishing feature sizes and the increase in the complexity of the designs. Therefore, it is desirable to provide a collaboration environment in which project participants (typically engineers) can interact, communicate, and design and develop their products, while also providing a secure environment in which each company's intranet and intellectual property are protected from the other company and in which project-specific information and intellectual property are protected from unauthorized individuals within any of the respective companies.

Previous collaboration approaches have united project teams via mail, teleconferencing, video conferencing, joint project plans, and frequent face-to-face meetings. Later innovations such as e-mail and file exchange protocols (e.g., file transport protocol, or FTP), have improved the immediacy of communication through use of networks, specifically the Internet. More recent advances, such as X Display in an X Window System, WebEx, and NetMeeting, utilize a cross-platform, client/server system for managing a windowed graphical user interface in a distributed network, thereby allowing someone to view someone else's desktop without physically traveling to the desktop site.

None of the foregoing approaches have approximated the efficiency that teams working together physically can achieve. For example, e-mail and FTP approaches are difficult to manage in view of the magnitude of common files associated with an IC engineering project, and are thus error-prone. Additionally, complex problems are difficult to address and solve through e-mail and FTP communication alone because the problems are often embedded in the design environments, which often differ from site to site and company to company. For another example, use of telnet technology allows one to run tools or applications on another site and to view text results, but does not support the graphical communication required in complex engineering projects. Remote viewing techniques do exist that can address the absence of graphical communication by allowing an offsite engineer to view the problem in its native context, but the majority of remote viewing techniques are run on operating systems not typically used in complex IC design projects.

Of course, co-location of engineering teams from different companies can provide the desired efficiencies, but it is often not feasible to co-locate personnel for geographical, cost, and logistical reasons. Furthermore, co-location incurs the problems of constraining the engineers to working only on the joint project and of isolating them from the rest of their organization.

Based on the foregoing, it is clearly desirable to provide an environment in which multiple companies or parties can remotely collaborate on an engineering or other project. There is a further need to provide a secure collaboration environment in which the companies are able to restrict access to only certain information, and to restrict access to only certain people.

A system is described which provides multiple companies with the ability to securely collaborate on a design or other project, while maintaining the security of their project and non-project resources. According to one aspect, the system includes a set of resources residing on a set of one or more utility servers maintained by a first company, an access control mechanism for controlling access to the set of resources, a secure network connection between the set of utility servers and a second company, and a remote controller for remotely viewing, by an authorized individual from the second company, a user interface of an application while an authorized individual from the first company is executing the application on the set of utility servers. In one embodiment, the user interface is a graphical user interface that displays a graphical representation, wherein the remote controller provides the capability to remotely view the graphical representation. In one embodiment, the remote controller is further configured to enable an authorized individual from the second company to remotely control execution of an application running on the set of utility servers.

According to one embodiment, the security of the secure network connection includes a secure association mechanism configured to establish a secure association between authorized individuals from the first and second companies. In another embodiment, the secure association mechanism includes a virtual point-to-point network connection which is established upon establishment of the secure association, whereby communication between the companies is limited to communication between specific devices that established the secure association; and an encryption/decryption mechanism for securing the data that is transmitted across the virtual point-to-point network connection. In yet another embodiment, the secure association is periodically renewed via an automated request and acknowledgement process.

In other embodiments, the set of resources include a file manager for managing data files shared among project participants, and a communication mechanism for managing messages posted by project participants.

According to one aspect, a secure inter-company collaboration system includes a first and second set of utility servers maintained at a first and second company, respectively, and first and second sets of resources residing on the respective utility servers. Thus, for example without limitation, specialists from one company who have developed a particular design tool and who thus have expertise in the use of the design tool, can securely collaborate with project participants from another company who are using the design tool, via the secure collaboration system. If configured appropriately, the system allows the design tool and other applications to execute on either company's servers, while providing personnel from the other company with the capability to view and control the tool in real-time.

Various implementations of the techniques described herein are embodied in various systems and methods.

The present invention is illustrated by way of example, and not by way of limitation, in the figures of the accompanying drawings and in which like reference numerals refer to similar elements and in which:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram logically illustrating a secure inter-company collaboration environment;

FIG. 2A is a block diagram illustrating a set of resources constituent to a collaboration environment, according to embodiments of the invention; FIG. 2B is a block diagram illustrating a secure network connection, according to embodiments of the invention;

FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example architecture for a collaboration environment, according to an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 4A is a flowchart illustrating a method for providing a secure inter-company collaboration environment, according to embodiments of the invention; and

FIG. 4B is a flowchart illustrating a method for controlling access to a secure network connection between companies, according to embodiments of the invention.

A secure inter-company collaboration environment is described herein. Scenarios in which the invention is utilized by multiple companies drives many of the requirements provided by the collaboration environment, but the invention is not limited to use only among multiple companies. Therefore, a company may also be generally referred to herein as a “party.”

In the following description, for the purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however, that the present invention may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the present invention.

Inter-Company Collaboration

Multi-company or joint projects are quite common in some industries, and often these projects have significant security requirements. Some security requirements are simply due to the fact that multiple independent companies are working together on a given project, but need to maintain security of their non-project resources. For example, companies participating in joint development of integrated circuits are protective of their proprietary and intellectual property assets that are not related to the joint project. Hence, companies do not want other companies to have access to their assets and, consequently, they need to ensure that their intranets are secure from unauthorized sources outside of the company. Furthermore, often companies want to restrict access to sensitive information only to authorized employees within the company, e.g., only employees working on a particular project. Other security requirements are due to the nature of the project, such as “Secret” or “Top Secret” national defense-related projects that are required to maintain information in secrecy for purposes of national security, or legal projects which may span multiple law firms or multiple offices within a national or multinational firm and that are required to maintain client confidentiality with respect to communications and work products. Thus, there are many contexts in which a working environment should afford the ability to openly communicate and collaborate among authorized participants in a project, while at the same time be secure enough to protect some assets from undesired access.

The techniques described herein provide a unique engineering (or other) collaboration environment (sometimes referred to as “the chamber”) that can unite multiple companies through a design or project lifecycle. These techniques provide a more flexible and “natural” engineering environment than prior approaches, essentially co-locating multiple parties virtually so that they can communicate and collaborate in real-time without the limitations and disadvantages of prior approaches. Collaboration, in this context, includes features that historically could not be achieved without physically co-locating project participants, and is intended to refer to project collaboration (e.g., design, development, or other joint effort to produce a work product) as opposed to a product exchange collaboration (e.g., a business-to-business product location/sales portal). These techniques also provide a trusted, secure remote working environment in which natural collaboration can be achieved without sacrificing the security of valuable information, intellectual property, and networks. These benefits are achieved through a novel and non-obvious combination of network architecture, security processes, and working tools and applications, which collectively are flexible enough to support different use models of, and adapt to changes during, a project lifecycle.

Whereas all project work could be performed at a single site, the collaboration environment also supports the division of work between sites. Thus, the environment can be adapted as new teams may be brought into the project during the project lifecycle or as the nature of the project evolves. For example, in the context of an organization that provides design and design support services (such as in the development of ICs), a typical project lifecycle could include the following phases: (i) initially supporting an existing project on an existing design environment at a customer site; (ii) transferring the design environment (i.e., the tools) to the secure inter-company collaboration environment (i.e., the chamber), and replacing or enhancing it; and (iii) running the existing project data in the new environment and debugging it. Use of the chamber allows developers from both, or all, of the participating companies to access the design environment in each of these phases, while allowing each company to maintain proper security from the outside and to control access to the project resources within each company at each phase of the project.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram logically illustrating a secure inter-company collaboration environment. As shown, four companies (Company ‘A’ through Company ‘D’) are collaborating in a collaboration environment 102 . Note that the number of companies that can access or be constituent to the collaboration environment is not limited to any particular number. As presented above, collaboration among multiple parties typically utilizes shared resources, and secure collaboration relies on restricted access to the shared resources. Hence, Companies A through D have access to a set of resources 104 through an access control mechanism 106 .

First, the set of resources 104 includes tools for completing the project or task at hand, such as relevant software applications to assist with the project tasks; remote viewing and controlling software for viewing and controlling the relevant software applications; file synchronization and management software for maintaining shared project documents and data among the companies; network administration/monitoring software, navigation software for accessing other resources; shared documents and data; and the like.

Second, access to the set of resources 104 is controlled and provided by the access control mechanism 106 , in order to secure the environment and associated resources. Generally, the access control mechanism 106 could be physical (e.g., without limitation, simply a locked door or a “dumb” switch) or virtual (e.g., without limitation, a firewall program running on a computer), or a combination of both hardware and software (e.g., without limitation, a “smart” switch or gateway). The access control mechanism 106 , however implemented, provides a first line of security with respect to accessing the set of resources 104 , by limiting access to the resources to specific authorized individuals. Additional levels of security may be provided with respect to accessing certain resources from the set of resources 104 , and are described below.

Note that the blocks representing the companies are depicted as overlapping with the collaboration environment 102 , to illustrate the concept that each collaborating company provides and controls a portion of the collaboration environment 102 , and that the collaboration environment 102 is essentially a secure extension of the companies' resources and environment. For example, each company may control a portion of the access control mechanism 106 , such as a firewall interfacing between each respective company network and a secure network tunnel constituent to the set of resources 104 . In this type of implementation, the chamber can be envisioned as encapsulating a portion of each company's resources and the shared project resources.

The companies associated with the inter-company collaboration environment 102 , after gaining access through the access control mechanism 106 , can communicate with each other and remotely access the set of resources 104 , via a secure network connection 108 .

Collaboration Environment Resources

Generally, various resources (such as a set of resources 104 ) are required in an environment in which work performance is expected. The collaboration environment of the present invention is no exception. FIG. 2A is a block diagram illustrating a set of resources 104 constituent to a collaboration environment 102 , according to embodiments of the invention.

In one embodiment, the secure inter-company collaboration environment includes a set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ), wherein the set of resources 104 includes a set of one or more utility servers 204 , an isolated data storage 206 , and an application remote controller 208 . According to other embodiments, the set of resources further includes an optional file manager 210 and an optional communication mechanism 212 .

A. Utility Server

The set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ) of collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) includes one or more utility servers 204 , which is typically implemented as software running on a computer platform. Utility server 204 is coupled to and accessible through the secure network connection 108 , upon gaining access to the collaboration environment 102 through access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ) and upon establishment of a secure association via secure association mechanism 220 .

In order to collaborate on a project, the project participants require various tools or applications. Hence, the utility server is configured to execute a set of software applications 240 for performing the project work tasks. Access to the utility server 204 may require a separate log-in authorization procedure. The applications 240 may be stored on utility server 204 , or may be accessed by utility server 204 if stored remotely. The software applications 240 include any software that parties may want to employ in the collaboration environment 102 , to facilitate the collaboration and completion of the tasks at hand. The software applications 240 may include, without limitation, design/development/engineering software (e.g., CAD/CAE graphical tools), electronic design automation software, emulation software, etc.

In certain embodiments, particular types of software are available for executing on utility server 204 . For example, application remote controller 208 , file manager 210 , and communication mechanism 212 are available for use in the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ), according to embodiments. These too can be provided on one or more utility servers 204 , or on some other platform within the collaboration environment 102 .

In one embodiment, the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) architecture includes a utility server 204 at each company site, whereby the software applications 240 can be executed on any of the multiple utility servers 204 .

B. Isolated Data Storage

The collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) has access to an isolated data storage 206 , coupled to and accessible by a utility server 204 and used to securely store access-controlled (project) data 260 . The data storage 206 is isolated in that it may be a portion of a larger data storage device or network, such as a disk collection, tape drive, or storage area network, but is partitioned per project. Furthermore, in one embodiment, the isolated data storage 206 is linked to the collaboration environment 102 through a secured subnet.

In one embodiment, access to the data 260 stored on data storage 206 is through a data authorization mechanism. For example, a separate log-in authorization procedure may be required to export data from the data storage 206 to the utility server 204 , thus providing another layer of security to the data.

C. Application Remote Controller

The set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ) of collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) includes application remote controller 208 . Application remote controller 208 may be configured on one or more utility servers 204 . To provide maximum collaboration functionality, application remote controller 208 is configured on each utility server 204 within the collaboration environment 102 , thus providing equivalent capabilities to all collaboration parties.

Access to the set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ) via the access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ) provides the capability, via the application remote controller 208 , to at least remotely:

(1) view a respective application user interface of one or more applications from the set of software applications 240 , as the one or more applications are executing, with an application user interface viewer 280 ;

(2) “shadow” a respective application user interface of one or more applications from the set of software applications 240 , as a different collaboration party executes the respective application, with an application user interface viewer 280 ; and

(3) control execution of one or more applications from the set of software applications 240 , with an application controller 282 .

According to one embodiment, the application remote controller 208 provides the capability to remotely view a graphical user interface that displays a graphical representation. This capability offers advantages over prior approaches that provide remote viewing of text only, without graphics (e.g., models of physical products). For duplex remote viewing and controlling between parties, i.e., both parties can remotely view and control applications running on the other party's computer, both the client and host portions of the application remote controller 208 are installed on respective utility servers 204 . Typically, shadowing also uses a request and authorization procedure between the parties involved in the shadowing. Examples of application remote controller 208 include, without limitation, Citrix® MetaFrame™, Oridus™ SpaceCruiser™, IBM XMX-LST, and Netopia® Timbuktu Pro, which provide desktop sharing and design communication tools.

Typically, application remote controllers are implemented in a client-server architecture, wherein the machine remotely accessing (“shadowing”) the application is equipped with a client-side application and the machine executing the application is equipped with an associated server-side application. Furthermore, if a person or machine wants to both locally host applications and remotely access applications on another machine, that machine is equipped with both the client-side and server-side applications.

D. File Manager

In one embodiment, the set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ) of collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) further includes file manager 210 , configured to manage shared data files, such as access-controlled data 260 from isolated data storage 206 . In one multiple server embodiment, file manager 210 is configured on all utility servers 204 of the environment 102 , so that all parties can retrieve synchronized files, revise them if necessary, and save them. The file manager 210 provides a document control mechanism that enables parties to know what data has been imported from isolated data storage 206 and ensures that various copies of a file are kept in version synchronization. File manager 210 also provides monitoring of document retrievals. Thus, employment of a file manager 210 provides a virtual file system common to all parties using the collaboration environment 102 .

A file manager such as file manager 210 typically includes a transmitter/receiver (T/R) 290 at each party site and a control panel 292 at one party site, although the invention is not limited to any specific architecture. The control panel 292 is used to set rules regarding copying of files from one T/R 290 to another, while the T/Rs 290 communicate with each other to exchange files back and forth while complying with the rules. Examples of rules include, without limitation: (1) copy file X from Party A to Party B at X time every day; and (2) as soon as Party A changes any file, copy the changed file to Party B; and (3) broadcast timestamp and file identifier to Party B each time Party A changes a file.

It is noteworthy that the file manager 210 , and other resources, can essentially operate independent from human intervention. That is, once a collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) and its associated set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ) are configured and initialized, the file manager 210 automatically operates in the background to manage and synchronize shared file resources.

E. Communication Mechanism

In one embodiment, the set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ) of collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) further includes communication mechanism 212 , configured to receive, store, and retrieve messages, textual or otherwise, from individuals that are authorized to access and work in the collaboration environment 102 . Communication mechanism 212 facilitates the discussion of issues in a common location, thereby enhancing the quality of the collaboration. One example of communication mechanism 212 is a conventional electronic “bulletin board,” but the invention is not so limited. Any mechanism allowing for posting of messages and reply messages, and providing organization and storage of such messages, may be used.

F. Navigation Mechanism

The set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ) may also include, in some embodiments, a navigation mechanism, provided to guide the authorized individuals through the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ). Unlike portal models, in a multi-server environment architecture, the development tools embodied in software applications 240 can be executed on any of the constituent utility servers 204 or on other compute servers connected to the utility servers 204 , and the architecture can change throughout the project lifecycle. Thus, the navigation mechanism assists in navigating through the collaboration environment 102 to locate and access particular resources of the set of resources 104 . Furthermore, the navigation mechanism provides the capability to see which applications are currently being used and the status of equipment within the collaboration environment 102 . For example, without limitation, a customized toolbar may embody the navigation mechanism.

Secure Network Connection

FIG. 2B is a block diagram illustrating the secure network connection 108 . A secure network connection 108 is configured between each of the participating companies or organizations. In the case of two companies, there is a secure network connection 108 between them. In the case of more than two companies, there is a secure network connection 108 between a central company and each of the other companies, according to one embodiment. The term central company is used simply to indicate a managing or controlling company with respect to the overall environment, which is able to manage and administer the shared resources of the set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ). A hub and spoke analogy may assist in visualizing the referenced architecture. In another embodiment, there is a secure network connection 108 between each company. The secure network connection 108 is coupled to an access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ), which is described in more detail below.

A secure association mechanism 220 is used to establish a secure association. The secure association is a threshold process to gain access to the other components or functionality related to the secure network connection 108 , i.e., a virtual point-to-point (PTP) network connection 222 and an encryption/decryption mechanism 224 . Upon establishment of the secure association, a virtual point-to-point (PTP) network connection 222 is established. Once the virtual PTP is established, the parties can exchange data through an encryption/decryption mechanism 224 . Thus, the secure association mechanism 220 , virtual PTP network connection 222 , and the encryption/decryption mechanism 224 contribute to the overall security of the secure network connection 108 .

1. Secure Association Mechanism

The secure association mechanism 220 is configured to establish a secure association between parties that want to establish and use a secure network connection 108 . The secure association mechanism 220 implements a recognition technique, whereby an electronic “handshake” between the parties is executed. For example, a technique that applies to ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) networks (which are commonly used in Europe) is for Party A to place a call, which identifies its device, to Party B and then to hang up. Party B's device is programmed to call back the calling party's device, i.e., the identified Party A device, and only that device. Thus, this form of request and acknowledge provides a secure association between Party A and Party B.

According to one embodiment, Party A communicates with Party B by providing its IP address and the serial number of a switching device that is used to communicate through the secure network connection 108 (e.g., a virtual private network (VPN) switching device). Party B looks up Party A's identifying information in a look-up table to verify that Party A is an authorized participant in the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ). Party A likewise, either before or after sending the communication to Party B, verifies Party B through its similar identifying information. Party A and Party B have established a mutual essay, and can therefore begin passing data between each other through a network “tunnel.” That is, the parties can encrypt communications, via the encryption/decryption mechanism 224 , and transmit them through the virtual PTP network connection 222 .

The secure association may be the second layer of security with respect to the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ). In one embodiment, in addition to the secure association mechanism 220 , the authorized individuals associated with Party A or Party B first identify themselves to access the machines configured within, or configured to access, the collaboration environment or system. The referenced first layer of security is embodied in the access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ). For example, without limitation, individuals utilize a badge card in conjunction with a card reader to gain physical access to a computer that is configured to access the collaboration system. For another example, without limitation, individuals use a token to prove their respective authority to enter the collaboration environment. That is, they may have to input an often-changing number that is displayed on a device in the possession of the individual, whereby the device displays the currently authorized number that is kept synchronized with a remote verification computer. Thus, by knowing the correct number to input, the individual at least has possession of the device. This token technique, possibly in combination with a badge/card reader technique and a personal log-in process, provides another layer of security with respect to accessing the secure collaboration environment.

The foregoing techniques may be implemented at a physical entrance to the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ), or may be implemented electronically, such that a person attempting to remotely access the environment 102 would need to input all of the necessary identifying and token information into an interface to the access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ). An example of remote input includes, without limitation, entering the information in a computer communicatively coupled to firewall software serving as the access control mechanism 106 .

In one embodiment, the secure association (also referred to as the essay) is periodically renewed by the secure association mechanism 220 , via an automated request and acknowledgement process. That is, one party (Party A) is caused to request a “re-key” from the other party (Party B), whereby a commonly known (among the parties) number or other token is transmitted from the acknowledging party (Party B) back to the requesting party (Party A). The token (also referred to as a key) is generated and maintained synchronously at each party by a common algorithm. Consequently, the requesting party (Party A) can confirm the new key that it received from the other party, and the secure association is therefore renewed. Keys that do not match can be an indication that an attempt to breach security has occurred, and communication and collaboration should be stopped until the key issue is resolved.

2. Virtual Point to Point Network Connection

The virtual PTP network connection 222 (sometimes referred to as a “tunnel”) contributes to the overall security of the secure network connection 108 , and is established upon establishment of the secure association. The term “point-to-point” is used to refer to a characteristic of the connection between parties after a secure association is completed. Accordingly, the PTP connection 222 can be implemented in various ways, for example, without limitation, as a VPN (Virtual Private Network), Frame Relay circuit (which provides a “permanent” virtual circuit, with the provider determining the routing of the frames), ISDN, Ti, etc. According to one embodiment, the virtual PTP network connection 222 is a VPN using the public network of networks commonly referred to as the Internet, bounded by VPN switches/devices at each end, i.e., at each party site. One point to note is that the PTP connection 222 cannot be circumvented due to the secure association mechanism 220 and the related key renewal process.

Furthermore, as the invention is not limited to any particular implementation of the virtual PTP network connection 222 , it is also not limited to any specific protocol. If dedicated lines are not leased, then, functionally, the protocol implemented should be capable of effectively using a WAN such as the Internet as a LAN. Examples of communication protocols include, without limitation, PPP (Point to Point Protocol), PPTP (Point to Point Tunneling Protocol), and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol. In addition, a proprietary tunneling protocol may be implemented to facilitate the virtual PTP network connection 222 within the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ).

In one embodiment, the virtual PTP network connection 222 is configured such that a set of one or more “open” ports at each end of the connection 222 is limited to only specific ports allocated for collaboration. That is, only the open ports will support communication therethrough. Consequently, signaling information or project data that is transmitted to ports that are not configured open for collaboration, is not received by the “receiving” party. Therefore, another level of security from outside intruders attempting to access the environment is provided. Likewise, attempts to transmit information or data from within the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) out through an unopened port are also inhibited.

In one embodiment, the virtual PTP network connection 222 is configured such that communication through the connection 222 is limited to between the devices that established the secure connection. In another embodiment, the virtual PTP network connection 222 is configured such that communication through the connection 222 is limited to between the devices that are on the same subnets as the devices that established the secure connection.

3. Encryption/Decryption Mechanism

Encryption/Decryption Mechanism 224 also contributes to the overall security of the secure network connection 108 . The encryption/decryption mechanism 224 supports the encryption of data that is transmitted across the virtual PTP network connection 222 after a secure association 220 has been established. As is known, encryption is the conversion of data or other information into a form that is not easily understood by unauthorized parties, and decryption is the process of converting encrypted data back into an understandable form, typically through use of a key (algorithm). The invention is not limited to any particular implementation of mechanism 224 , thus, standard or proprietary algorithms can be used.

In one embodiment, triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) encryption is used to encrypt information transmitted across secure network connection 108 , through which the information is encrypted and decrypted using three respective sub-keys (which may be implemented as a single triple-length key). That is, the first key is used to encrypt, the second key to decrypt, and the third key to encrypt. As technology evolves, other forms or methods of encryption can be used, for example, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithms such as Rijndael.

Access Control Mechanism

Access to the set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ) within collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) is through access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ). Therefore, one gains access to the collaboration environment 102 before establishing the secure association through secure association mechanism 220 . In that sense, access control mechanism is the first layer of security provided by the collaboration environment. In general, the access control mechanism 106 provides limited access to the set of resources 104 , while prohibiting access to other company networks. Hence, the companies using the collaboration environment cannot access other companies' internal networks and resources.

Access control mechanism 106 may be implemented at a physical entrance to the collaboration environment 102 , or may be implemented electronically such that a person attempting to remotely access the environment 102 through a computer would input necessary identifying and token information into an interface to the access control mechanism 106 . Examples of remote input include, without limitation, entering the information in a computer communicatively coupled to firewall software serving as the access control mechanism 106 , and following a AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) support protocol such as RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service). In this scenario, the firewall typically compares the identifying (for example, without limitation, personal identification and computer identification, such as IP address) and token information (if applicable) with a base of information (for example, without limitation, an access list) specifying authorized persons or machines, and consequently allows or disallows communications to be transmitted to and from the person's computer to a utility server 204 through a secure network connection 108 (for example, without limitation, a VPN tunnel).

In one embodiment, the access control mechanism 106 is configured to monitor accesses to the set of resources 104 . For example, who and when someone “enters” the collaboration environment 102 can be electronically recorded in a log.

In one embodiment, each party to the collaboration environment 102 controls a portion of the access control mechanism 106 . For example, each party could control respective firewalls that are passed through to enter the environment 102 , wherein each respective firewall is an interface between each respective company network and the environment 102 . This scenario is illustrated in the example presented in FIG. 3 . Furthermore, this scenario is scalable such that, regardless of the number of participating parties, each party manages their respective firewall to grant or deny access to the collaboration environment 102 and the associated set of resources 104 .

Collaboration Environment

FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example architecture for a collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ), according to an embodiment of the invention. The specific architecture presented is for illustration purposes, thus the invention is not limited to the architecture depicted.

FIG. 3 depicts a two-company collaboration environment 300 , configured for Company A and Company B. As depicted, portions of the collaboration environment components are within each company, and similar components appear within each company, with the exception of data storage 310 . Similar components (e.g., 302 A and 302 B) are at times referred to in this description collectively with a single reference (e.g., 362 ). Furthermore, the activities described below, with respect to accessing the collaboration environment 300 and constituent components, is applicable in both directions, i.e., from Company A to Company B and from Company B to Company A.

Each company uses a client machine 302 (e.g., a conventional computer) and a LAN 304 , as an access mechanism to the environment 300 . A firewall 306 provides the entrance point to the environment 300 , and in this example provides the functionality of access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ). Once an individual gets into the environment 300 (i.e., through firewall 306 ), the individual has access to a respective local server 308 , which provides the functionality of utility server 204 ( FIG. 2A ), on which they can use tools (e.g., software applications 240 of FIG. 2A ) to perform work tasks. Access to the server 308 may require an additional log-in and authorization procedure.

In order to collaborate with the other company, an individual needs to get through a second firewall 312 to access a secure network connection (i.e., secure network connection 108 of FIG. 2B ). To establish and access the secure network connection, the individual needs to establish a secure association (described above) via VPN switch 314 , upon which a connection 316 is established, with characteristics of a virtual point-to-point network connection 222 ( FIG. 2B ). Once the connection 316 is established, the individual can begin to collaborate with the other company, including transmission and reception of encrypted data through the connection 316 , utilizing an encryption/decryption mechanism 224 .

Once the connection 316 is established, the individual can use an application remote controller 208 ( FIG. 2A ) to remotely view and control applications executing on the other company's server 308 . Access to the other company's server 308 may require another log-in and authorization procedure. In addition, the individual can gain access to data on a data storage 310 , which provides the functionality of isolated data storage 206 ( FIG. 2A ). Importing data (e.g., access-controlled data 260 of FIG. 2A ) from data storage 310 may again require an additional log-in and authorization procedure.

Note that one company could supply and or manage most of the components, except, practically speaking, client machine 302 and LAN 304 . Note also that in order to ensure overall security of the collaboration environment 300 , one company is likely to manage and control the majority of the components depicted in FIG. 3 , except perhaps the other company's client machine 302 , LAN 304 , firewall 306 , firewall 312 , and server 308 . To that end, network administration and monitoring resources can be installed to provide real-time monitoring of the network performance characteristics, such as utilization, uptime, and success ratio of jobs.

Configuring the servers 308 between two firewalls 306 and 312 protects them from unauthorized access from within the company (via firewall 306 ) as well as from unauthorized access from outside of the company (via firewall 312 ). Implementation of characteristics of the connection 316 , i.e., a secure association mechanism 220 ( FIG. 2B ) and a virtual PTP connection 222 ( FIG. 2B ) through use of VPN switch 314 , and an encryption/decryption mechanism 224 ( FIG. 2B ), the environment 300 is protected from unauthorized access to the transmissions traveling between Company A and Company B. Hence, even if hackers were able to gain access to the connection 316 and intercept communications, they would not likely be able to decrypt the encrypted data, nor send or receive any data to the server 308 and beyond into the LAN 304 .

As previously described, if a person or machine (e.g., utility server 308 A) wants to both locally host applications and remotely access applications on another machine, that machine is equipped with both the client-side and server-side applications. In addition, in the system architecture depicted in FIG. 3 , accessing an application or other resources residing on utility server 308 B from client machine 302 A uses both client-side and server-side software on utility server 308 A as well as server-side software on utility server 308 B, according to one embodiment. As such, client 302 A is a client to host utility server 308 A with respect to accessing resources on utility server 308 A through firewall 306 A, and utility server 308 A is a client to host utility server 308 B with respect to accessing resources on utility server 308 B. Hence, client 302 A is able to remotely view and control resources on utility server 308 B, through utility server 308 A.

For example, for client 302 A to view or shadow an application executing on utility server 308 B, client 302 A first invokes the local client-side remote controller to remotely access utility server 308 A by communicating with the server-side remote controller residing on utility server 308 A. The server-side remote controller on utility server 308 A invokes the client-side remote controller residing locally on utility server 308 A, to communicate with the server-side remote controller residing on utility server 308 B. Consequently, through this interaction between client-side and server-side remote controller applications, client 302 A makes a “double-hop” to gain viewing and controlling capabilities with respect to applications executing on remote utility server 308 B.

According to one embodiment, one collaboration party (e.g., Company A) can use an application remote controller 208 ( FIG. 2A ) from Vendor X or a proprietary application remote controller 208 to access resources on utility server 308 A. Company A can then use an application remote controller 208 from Vendor Y or an application remote controller 208 that is proprietary to another collaborating party (e.g., Company B) to execute a computing job on utility server 308 B or to shadow a job executing by Company B on utility server 308 B. Furthermore, Company A can run an application (e.g., a design application) proprietary to Company B. As such, a practical but non-limiting implementation includes a situation in which Company B has internal technology (proprietary or otherwise) that is not available to Company A, and Company A is allowed limited use of the internal technology strictly within the collaboration environment 300 .

Use of Collaboration Environment

There are numerous scenarios in which the collaboration environment is useful. One example implementation of the teachings provided herein is as follows.

Company A (e.g., Cadence Design Systems Inc.) designs and markets integrated circuit design tools, i.e., software applications for designing, laying out, verifying, emulating, etc., integrated circuits. In addition, Company A also provides design and CAD management services, based on their expertise in the field of IC design and their intimate knowledge and expertise with the aforementioned design tools. Company B designs and markets integrated circuits using Company A's design tools.

During Company B's design cycle for a particular IC, engineering issues arise in which consultation with Company A's services experts is required. Thus, a secure collaboration environment 300 ( FIG. 3 ) is configured, so that Company A services experts can collaborate with Company B's design engineers. Each company provides a utility server protected by firewalls 306 A–B and 312 A–B ( FIG. 3 ) from inside the respective companies and protected from the public network (e.g., the Internet) used to facilitate the secure network connection 108 ( FIG. 1 ).

Advantageously, after establishment of a secure network connection (e.g., a VPN between Company A and Company B over the Internet), Company B engineers can execute jobs on their utility server 308 B ( FIG. 3 ) using Company A's design applications, and Company A experts can remotely view (or shadow), launch, and control the execution of the jobs on Company B's utility server 308 B, in real-time via Company A's utility server 308 A. The foregoing process uses application remote controller 208 ( FIG. 2A ) and the secure network connection 108 ( FIG. 2B ) in communicating between utility server 308 A and utility server 308 B. Company A experts can view the graphical representations generated by the design applications, and can remotely launch and control execution of the application if necessary.

In addition, Company B can remotely view and control applications executing on Company A's utility server 308 A, via Company B's utility server 308 B. For example, Company A's engineers may identify a problem using the foregoing techniques, and demonstrate a solution to that problem on utility server 308 B. Again, the application remote controller 208 and the secure network connection 108 are used to communicate between utility server 308 B and utility server 308 A.

Still further, once the collaboration environment 300 is established, applications at Company A can interact with applications at Company B with no human intervention. For example, the file manager 210 runs in the background to automatically manage and synchronize shared resources. Since the collaboration environment 300 is “always on”, other applications, such as scripts, can be installed at each site to enable background (i.e., automatic) interaction between the sites for various purposes. Hence, the application interaction described is distinct from application interactions that occur in a hosted environment.

Monitoring tools can also be installed into the collaboration environment to facilitate one company monitoring and measuring work at the other company site. For example, software tools exist that can perform all of the following functions: (1) run jobs, (2) monitor the jobs, (3) analyze the job output, (4) revise the job parameters based on the analysis, and (5) re-run the jobs with the revised parameters. Thus, a monitoring tool at Company A can measure and analyze jobs or processes running on the Company B utility server 308 B, and add value to the process running at Company B by revising the parameters and resubmitting the job. This iterative process provided by such a tool can be automated to a certain extent and facilitates the fine-tuning of a design. Thus, such a tool can be installed on a utility (e.g., utility server 308 A, 308 B) or other server within the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) as part of the applications 240 ( FIG. 2A ) of the set of resources 104 ( FIG. 1 ), to facilitate real-time collaboration between Company A and Company B.

The foregoing is an example of a practical use of the systems described herein, but use of the invention is not so limited. Those skilled in the art can appreciate other implementations of the techniques described, which fall within the scope of the claims appended hereto.

Method for Providing a Secure Inter-Company Collaboration Environment

FIG. 4A is a flowchart illustrating a method for providing a secure inter-company collaboration environment, according to embodiments of the invention. With reference to FIG. 4A , step 402 controls access to a first set of one or more utility servers maintained by a first company (for example, utility server 308 A of FIG. 3 or utility server 204 of FIG. 2A ). Depending on whether access to a local server (e.g., at Company A from viewpoint of Company A) or a remote server (e.g., at Company B from viewpoint of Company A) is being controlled, step 402 can be implemented, for example, with access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ) in the case of a local server; or access control mechanism 106 and secure network connection 108 ( FIG. 2B ) in the case of a remote server.

At step 404 , access to a first set of resources (for example, set or resources 104 of FIG. 1 ) residing on the first set of utility servers is controlled. In this context, the set of resources 104 does not necessarily include the utility server 204 as depicted in FIG. 2A , for access to the utility server 204 is controlled at step 402 . Thus, in addition to controlling access to the set of resources 104 by controlling access to the utility server 204 on which the applications 240 ( FIG. 2A ) reside, access to the applications 240 may require an additional log-on routine and one or more associated verification/authorization routines. Access to the other resources of the set of resources, such as isolated data storage 206 , application remote controller 208 , file manager 210 , and communication mechanism 212 , may also be controlled via additional log-on and verification/authorization routines.

Step 406 controls access to a secure network connection (for example, secure network connection 108 of FIG. 2B ) between the first set of utility servers and a second company participating in project collaboration. Step 406 can be implemented, for example, via secure association mechanism 220 ( FIG. 2B ), as described above. Controlling access to the secure network connection also controls use of the network connection.

FIG. 4B is a flowchart illustrating a method for controlling access to a secure network connection between companies, i.e., step 406 of FIG. 4A , according to embodiments of the invention. At step 420 , authorization through an access control mechanism (for example, access control mechanism 106 of FIG. 1 , as described above) is required. At step 422 , establishment of a secure association (for example, secure association mechanism 220 of FIG. 2B , as described above), is required. At step 424 , upon establishment of the secure association in step 422 , a virtual point-to-point network connection (described above) is maintained. At step 426 , communications that are transmitted across the virtual point-to-point network are encrypted (for example, through encryption/decryption mechanism 224 of FIG. 2B , described above). At optional step 428 , the secure association is periodically renewed. Implementation of step 428 can be through secure association mechanism 220 , as described above.

Returning to FIG. 4A , access to a remote controller (for example, application remote controller 208 of FIG. 2A ) is controlled at step 408 . This step can be independent of step 404 , at which the first set of resources is generally controlled, or can be a sub-step of step 404 . As described above, access to a remote controller may require additional log-on and verification/authorization routines. Furthermore, if the remote controller is proprietary to a particular company, that company may require additional routines to be performed to access their proprietary remote controller.

At optional step 410 , access to the secure network connection is logged, i.e., recorded. Hence, monitoring the use of the collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ), generally, is thereby provided. In addition, monitoring of network traffic across the secure network connection may also be provided, typically, for security purposes. Step 410 can be implemented, for example, by access control mechanism 106 ( FIG. 1 ).

At optional step 410 , a communication mechanism that is configured to receive, store, and retrieve messages from authorized individuals, is maintained. Step 410 can be implemented by using a conventional electronic bulletin board application.

The foregoing processes represent, generally, a method for providing a secure inter-company collaboration environment such as collaboration environment 102 ( FIG. 1 ) or collaboration environment 300 ( FIG. 3 ). Although process steps are described in a particular order in FIGS. 4A and 4B , embodiments of the invention are not necessarily limited to any particular order of carrying out such steps, nor are embodiments necessarily limited to carrying out every step described. Thus, implementation of the principles, techniques, and mechanisms described herein may vary considerably and still fall within the scope of the invention.

Extensions and Alternatives

Alternative embodiments of the invention are described throughout the foregoing description, and in locations that best facilitate understanding the context of the embodiments. Furthermore, the invention has been described with reference to specific embodiments thereof. It will, however, be evident that various modifications and changes may be made thereto without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the invention. For example, the collaboration environment is depicted with a single utility server at each location. However, the techniques described herein are not limited to such a configuration, for implementation of the collaboration may include additional compute servers connected to the utility servers. Therefore, the specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.

In addition, in this description certain process steps are set forth in a particular order, and alphabetic and alphanumeric labels may be used to identify certain steps. Unless specifically stated in the description, embodiments of the invention are not necessarily limited to any particular order of carrying out such steps. In particular, the labels are used merely for convenient identification of steps, and are not intended to specify or require a particular order of carrying out such steps.